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THE INTEREST OF THE AMICUS CURIAE 
The State of Ax izona regulates recreati onal boating, and many 
other activities and services on that portion of the Glen Canyon 
Recreation Area (GCNRA) located within Arizona, just as the State 
of Utah regulates those activities and services in Utah. The 
outcome of this appeal, therefore, is likely to influence Arizona. 
While the vast ma j ority of I jake PoweJ ] and the GCNRA lie 
within the exterior boundaries of Utah, the remaining portion lies 
within the boundaries of Arizona. The area within Arizona lies 
with :i n Coconino Coui lty and contain is the Cd t:y of Page Glen Canyon 
Dam, Carl Hayden Visitor Center, Wahweap Marina, Lee's Ferry (a 15 
mile stretch ^f th-:- Colorado River below Glen Canyon Dam,, and a 
renowned trout ; _£n^ry ' '•""' ' , appi oximately 1 2 mi llion people 
visited the GCNRA. 3y 1983, these numbers had increased to two 
-v ' ~ '- > • - - - - - - -; - ^rs entering by way of Arizona highways . 
Sierra J_^ :'cc^, - 5 F. Supp. 5 9, n. i (D.Utah 198' 7) . The 
latest visiior information available shows that from January ] 
19 9 6 1 • Augu s t: 3 D , 19 9 - ' * " ~ ~ ~ -eerie "' ^ - = - ' ^  GCNRA 
(information provided by telephone by National Park Service on 
October 16, 19 96). 
The goods and sez vi ces rendered t: : • the GCNRA and i t s ",;: r 1 s i t ors 
by Arizona through its taxpayers include, but are not limited to, 
providing marinas, gasoline, supplies, accommodations and 
restaurants , highway s , e 1 ect:rici t:y, 1 aw enf orcement water, hea 11h 
care, social services, and stocking of fish and management of 
wildlife. In addition, agreements between the National Park 
1 
Service (NPS) and various state and local agencies in Arizona 
pertain to a broad range of activities relating to wildlife, 
boating safety administration, the use cf radio frecuencies 
investigative roles of NPS commissioned officers in relation to 
state and local agencies, use of Coconino County's sheriff's office 
radio frequency, use of Arizona lake improvement funds for 
construction of Wahweap visitor use facilities, deputization of 
Arizona public safety personnel as National Park Service Special 
Police Officers, and use of Arizona telecommunications sites. 
Appellants' Brief at 22, 23. 
In order to pay for those services, Arizona collects a 
significant amount of sales, income, property and other taxes and 
fees from the business generated at the GCNRA. It also collects a 
substantial amount of revenue from the sales of hunting and fishing 
licenses and from the licensing of recreational watercraft and 
their trailers. 
All or many of Arizona's vast interests at GCNRA may be 
significantly affected by the outcome of Appellants' appeal in this 
case; especially if Appellants are arguing that ail state 
regulation in the GCNRA has been preempted. {See footnote 3, p. 6) 
If Appellants prevail in this appeal, the grand system of operation 
at GCNRA, including Lake Powell, may well be turned on its head. 
This system is complicated, involving many federal, state, and 
local governmental parties. Nevertheless, it is a system that has 
functioned smoothly and effectively in providing power, irrigation, 
and recreational resources for many years to millions of people. 
2 
Because Appellants are wrong, Arizona wants to help the Court 
by shedding additional light on the issues presented. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASS 
While the constitutionality of Arizona's watercraft 
registration fees is not at issue in this appeal; an explanation of 
i i o w A i i z o i i a s w a t e z c r a f t i e g i s t :r a t i o i i s y s t e i n d i f f e r s f r o m t h a i: : i ] 
Utah may be helpful. 
Article 9, § 16 of the Arizona Constitution1 specifically 
exempts all non-commercial watercraft from ad valorem property 
:axes . However, Arizona Revised Statutes, Annotated ("A.R.S.") 
- ' . " ~ -324 (see Exhiki*" A , rrovi leF f?r 
the registration and taxation of watercraft. Briefly, all 
undocumented vessels2 in Arizona are required to be numbered in 
compliance with r u les and regulati.... .rizona Game and Fish 
Commission in accordance with the federally approved numbering 
system. A.R.S. § 5-322. The owner of each watercraft requiring 
numbering must obtain that registration decal from the Arizona Game 
""Section 16: "Commencing January 1, _. . ^ „ watercraft 
registered for operation in Arizona, excluding watercraft owned 
and operated for any commercial purpose, is exempt from ad 
valorem property taxes. Watercraft exempt from ad valorem 
property taxes shall be subject to or exempt from a license tax, 
as may be prescribed by law." 
Undocumented vessels are those under 5 net tons not 
registered under the laws of a foreign country. 46 U.S.C. § 
12102. Recreational boats are undocumented vessels unless the 
owner applies for documentation with the Coast Guard. If a 
recreational boat is documented by the Coast Guard, it requires 
no further registration or numbering in Arizona A.R.S. § 5-
322(A). 
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and Fish Department. A registration fee of four dollars and a 
license tax of $.45 per foot of length or fraction thereof up to 
and including eighteen feet and $.68 per foot of length for each 
foot or fraction thereof over eighteen feet must be paid by Arizona 
residents. A.R.S. § 5-321(A) (1). Non-residents must pay a 
registration fee of ten dollars and a tax of $1.45 per foot of 
length or fraction thereof up to and including eighteen feet and 
$2.75 per foot of length for each foot or fraction thereof over 
eighteen feet. A.R.S. § 5-321(A)(2). 
STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Arizona presents no additional issues for review. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Although Congress has enacted statutes and the federal 
executive branchs have enacted regulations that, together, 
extensively govern activities in the GCNRA, the States of Arizona 
and Utah nevertheless still have authority to regulate recreational 
watercraft and other activities in the GCNRA when the States' laws 
and regulations do not conflict with federal regulations. The 
federal government has not preempted the boat registration laws of 
these States. There is no explicit statement by Congress that it 
intends to preempt state regulation, there is no conflict between 
the federal and state statutes and regulations, and the federal 
government has not occupied the field of interstate commerce in the 
GCNRA. 
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Moreover, Appellants have failed to demonstrate how Utah's 
boat: registratic i ] statute v iolates ti le Ii iter state _;nmerce Clause . 
The statute regulates evenhandedly, it effects a legitimate local 
public interest, and it does not discrim: nate aga I nsz interstate 
commerce either on its face or in its practical effect. 
ARGUMENT 
I. BACKGROUND FACTS 
With the following exceptions, Arizona does not dispute the 
background - - _ a.- . —reed by Appellants in their brief at pages 
4-10. 
First, Arizona takes exception to the statement that- nSi ich 
services include those that are within the traditional police 
powers of the state." Appellants' Brief at n. There is no 
elaboration 1 /^hii r h<~°^ cpyv-;,^,-
 i * .-> Arizona I ^  1 i^ >r^, \ ,t 
retains its police powers within the GCNRA, as is explained herein 
at page 12. 
Ariz-,:.- ci . ~ J :_- . - . . - ' . -r .^.vir:::^: .- ., '"The cost: of boat 
registrazion in zhe defendanz's staz= of residence are 
substantially less than the State of Utah's requirements and is 
a 1 s o s ub s t a n t i a 11 y 1 e s s t i la i l t he c o s t • D f registering with the 
United States Coast Guard." Id, at 8, Arizona is not aware of the 
cost to register Appellants' boats with the Coast Guard or in 
Appellants' state of residence. 
!) 
II. THE STATES OF ARIZONA AND UTAH HAVE AUTHORITY TO 
REGULATE RECREATIONAL BOATING WITHIN THE GLEN 
CANYON NATIONAL RECREATION AREA, AND THOSE STATES 
HAVE NOT BEEN PREEMPTED BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT! 
FROM DOING SO. 
Appellants argue that Congress and the federal executive 
branch have preempted the State of Utah from regulating boat 
registration within the GCNRA because preemption has occurred 
through express congressional statement, a conflict between state 
and federal laws, and federal government occupation of the field of 
interstate commerce within the GCNRA.3 Appellants' Brief at 10-17. 
An analysis of Appellants' argument shows that it is built 
upon a foundation of sand and cannot stand. 
A. Congress Made No Express Preemption Statement 
The general rule is that the power of Congress to control and 
regulate navigation is supreme and exclusive as to all matters of 
national concern in which uniformity is essential, or to which 
Congress has already acted, and any state law that is repugnant to, 
or inconsistent with, an act of Congress on the subject is void. 
3Arizona is unsure of the extent of Appellants' argument on 
the issue of preemption. Some statements made by Appellants 
could be taken to mean that they argue that all state laws and 
regulations on the GCNRA have been preempted, including boat 
registration laws. For example, Appellants state, "Congress has 
enacted a series of laws that extensively govern activities 
occurring within the Colorado River corridor and within the 
GCNRA, and the federal executive departments have promulgated 
extensive, detailed and broadly applied regulations, that 
cumulatively have displaced and preempted the operation of state 
laws within the GCNRA, including the boat registration laws." 
Appellants' Brief at 3. They also state, "There simply is no 
room for independent state action within the GCNRA." Id. at 24. 
For purposes of this amicus brief, however, Arizona takes the 
position that Appellants argue that the federal government has 
only preempted the area of boat registrations on the GCNRA. 
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Harman v. City of Chicago, 147 U.S. 396 (1893); Moran v. City of 
New Orleans, 112 U.S. 69 (1884); Morgan v. Parham, 83 U.S. 471 
(1872); Smith v. Turner, 48 U.S. 283 (1849); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 
U.S. 1 (1824). 
Notwithstanding the supremacy of the power of Congress to 
regulate navigation, the States may pass statutes that incidentally 
affect navigation and shipping and such statutes, except in matters 
where uniformity is essential, are valid and effective until 
Congress acts on the same subject. Kelly v. State of Washington, 
ex rel, Foss Co., 302 U.S. 1 (1'937) ; Wilson v. McNamee, 102 U.S. 
572 (1880); Gilman v. City of Philadelphia, 70 U.S. 713 (1865); 
Smith v. Maryland, 59 U.S. 71 (1855). 
For a finding of an intent to preempt, a clear and manifest 
statement of purpose is "always required." Puerto Rico Dept. of 
Consumer Affairs v. Isla Petroleum Corp., 485 U.S. 495, 503 (1988) . 
Appellants cite the Federal Boat Safety Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 
4301, et seq. , and 46 U.S.C. §§ 13101, et seg. , and then state, 
"Congress expressly barred states from enforcing their own 
recreational vessel performance and safety standards." Appellants' 
Brief at 12-13. Appellants also state, "Nothing in the Federal 
boat safety laws, the Coast Guard laws and regulations or the laws 
administered by the Secretary of the Interior confer jurisdiction 
upon the states to regulate boating activities within the GCNRA." 
Appellants' Brief at 14. Nothing could be further from the truth. 
In fact, 46 U.S.C. § 4306, states just the opposite: 
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section 4305 of this title, a State or political 
subdivision of a State may not establish, continue 
in effect, or enforce a law or regulation 
establishing a recreational vessel or associated 
equipment performance or other safety standard or 
imposing a requirement for associated equipment 
(except insofar as the State or political 
subdivision may, in the absence of the Secretary's 
disapproval, regulate the carrying or use of marine 
safety articles to meet uniquely hazardous 
conditions or circumstances within the State) that 
is not identical to a regulation prescribed under 
section 4302 of this title. 
This section allows States to enforce their laws or regulations in 
at least two different situations. First, States may pass and 
enforce recreational vessel or associated equipment performance or 
other safety standards which are identical to a regulation 
prescribed under 46 U.S.C. § 4302. Second, States may, in some 
instances, regulate the carrying or use of marine safety articles 
to meet uniquely hazardous conditions or circumstances within that: 
State. Contrary to Appellants' statement, this section hardly bars 
states from enforcing their own recreational vessel performance and 
safety standards. 
In State v. Nettleton, 367 So.2d 755 (La. 1979), defendants 
argued that the predecessor to 46 U.S.C. § 4306, 46 U.S.C. § 1459,4 
4uSec. 1459. Federal preemption in issuance of standards: 
Unless permitted by the Secretary under 
section 1458 of this title, no State or 
political subdivision thereof may establish, 
continue in effect, or enforce any provision 
of law or regulation which establishes any 
boat or associated equipment performance or 
other safety standard, or which imposes any 
requirement for associated equipment, except, 
unless disapproved by the Secretary, the 
carrying or using of marine safety articles 
8 
preempted the field of boat safety that the state statutes they 
were cited for purported to regulate. However, the court stated: 
Defendants' initial argument that the Federal 
Boat Safety Act preempts the field of boating 
safety on the navigable waters of the State of 
Louisiana has no merit. The Federal Statute, 46 
U.S.C.A., Sec. 1459, expressly provides that the 
states may establish boat safety regulations, so 
long as they are identical to the federal 
regulations. 
367 So.2d at 759. 
In addition, another provision in the Federal Boat Safety Act, 
46 U.S. C. § 13101, contains the following language: 
(a) To encourage greater State participation 
and uniformity in boating safety and facility 
improvement efforts, and particularly to permit the 
States to assume the greater share of boating 
safety education, assistance, and enforcement 
activities, the Secretary shall carry out a 
national recreational boating safety and facilities 
improvement program. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Such statements as these can hardly be considered explicit 
statements by Congress that it intended to preempt the enforcement 
of state laws and regulations for boat registration and regulation 
in the GCNRA. To the contrary, they are explicit statements by 
Congress that state laws and regulations to regulate boating 
activities will be encouraged and enforceable, so long as they do 
not conflict with federal regulations. 
to meet uniquely hazardous conditions or 
circumstances within the State, which is not 
identical to a Federal Regulation issued 
under section 1454 of this title. Pub. L. 
92-75 Sec. 10 Aug. 10, 1971, 
85 Stat. 217. 
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B. No Conflict Exists Between State and Federal Statutes and 
Regulations in The GCNRA 
Appellants argue that there is a direct conflict of federal 
and state laws in the area of boat numbering and registration. 
They point out that 36 C.F.R. § 3.1 requires an identification 
number to be displayed on the hull of each vessel operated within 
the GCNRA, and allege that this requirement directly conflicts with 
Utah's requirement that every such boat: have both the 
identification number either issued by the Coast Guard or by the 
State, and a certificate from the county assessor that the owner 
has paid the property tax on the boat. Appellants' Brief at 15. 
Again, Appellants are mistaken. 
These federal and state statutes and regulations do not 
conflict. Just the opposite is true. They work in harmony with 
each other as they were intended. In fact, they provide Utah 
explicit authority for the tax here in question. 
The Federal Boat Safety Act addresses the numbering of 
undocumented vessels. All undocumented vessels are required to 
have a number issued by the proper issuing authority in the State 
in which the vessel is principally operated. 46 U.S.C. § 12301. 
The U.S. Secretary of Transportation prescribes a standard 
numbering system and approves state numbering systems consistent 
with the standard numbering system. A State with an approved 
numbering system is the uissuing authority" for the issuance of the 
numbers. When a vessel is numbered in a State, it is deemed in 
compliance with the numbering system of that State. 46 U.S.C. § 
10 
12302. Federal law provides specific authority for the Utah 
property tax: 
The authority issuing a number under this 
chapter [a state with an approved numbering system] 
may prescribe regulations and establish fees to 
carry out the intent of this chapter. The fees 
shall apply equally to residents and nonresidents 
of the State. A Staze issuing authority may impose 
only conditions for vessel numbering that are -
(1) prescribed by this chapter or regulations 
of the Secretary about the standard numbering 
system; or 
(2) related to proof of payment of State or 
local taxes. 
46 U.S.C. § 12307 (emphasis added). 
Thus the laws and regulations work in harmony; not in 
conflict. Numbering of undocumented vessels is required by federal 
regulation. States whose numbering systems are approved are the 
issuing authority for the federally required vessel numbers. 
Vessel numbers issued by approved States are deemed in compliance 
with the numbering requirement, or registration requirement, of 
that State. Approved States may prescribe regulations and 
establish fees to accomplish the numbering. A condition for vessel 
numbering, or registration, must be related to proof of payment of 
state or local taxes or compliance with the law or regulations of 
the Secretary of Transportation. 
If Appellants prevail in this appeal, this harmonious and 
effective system of numbering and registration throughout the State 
11 
of Arizona, not just in GCNRA, will be turned on its head. Others 
may choose to argue that the provisions of the Federal Boat Safety 
Act will no longer govern in this area. 
The Commerce Clause in no way relieves or obstructs the States 
in the exercise of their police power. Riis v. Commonwealth, 418 
S.W.2d 396 (Ky.1967). Although most exercises of the police power 
affect interstate commerce to some degree, not every exercise is 
invalid under the Commerce Clause. American Can Co. v. Oregon 
Liquor Control Comm'n, 517 P.2d 691 (Or. App. 1974) . State 
regulation, based on the police power, which does not discriminate 
against interstate commerce or operate to disrupt its required 
uniformity, may constitutionally stand. Head v. New Mexico Bd. of 
Examiners in Optometry, 374 U.S. 424 (1963); Huron Portland Cement 
Co. v. City of Detroit, Michigan, 362 U.S. 440 (1960). 
Utah has done nothing more than exercise its police power to 
regulate boat registrations by way of payment of property taxes on 
those boats. Those taxes do not impinge upon the authority of 
Congress to regulate interstate commerce. 
C. The Federal Government Has Not Occupied The Field 
of Interstate Commerce Within The GCNRA 
Appellants' argument on this point has little or nothing to do 
with interstate commerce. They simply argue that because of the 
overall pervasive regulatory scheme imposed by the federal 
government on the GCNRA, it appears as though Congress "left no 
room" for additional state or local laws. Appellants' Brief 
at 17-18. After citing several cases, Appellants conclude with the 
12 
bald assertion that, "There simply is no room for independent state 
action within the GCNRA. Any state action must depend upon 
cocceracive independent acreemen"cs with the Department of the 
Interior and Transportation agencies." Id. at 24. 
Even if, for che sake of argument, any state action must 
depend upon independent agreements with federal agencies,5 and that 
circumstance alone amounts to federal government occupation of the 
field of interstate commerce on the GCNRA, Appellants fail to 
demonstrate how the States of Utah and Arizona are attempting to 
regulate interstate commerce in violation of federal regulation.6 
Moreover, Appellants' entire premise is incorrect that state 
activities in the GCNRA are entirely dependent upon agreements with 
the federal agencies. Appellants continue to ignore the plain 
language and meaning of the congressional acts referred to earlier 
herein which clearly give States independent powers to regulate 
boat registrations and other activities in the GCNRA. 
Appellants believe that, in general, uniformity of laws does 
not exist on the Colorado River and Lake Powell and that this 
confusion does not lead to an advancement of national interests. 
50f course, independent agreements by the States are not 
required. The States enter such agreements pursuant to their 
sovereign powers. 
cIn fact, Appellants have failed to demonstrate than this 
case even involves interstate commerce. Generally speaking, 
anything that can be bought and sold is a subject of commerce. 
Kansas City v. Seaman, 99 Kan. 1431, 160 P. 1139 (1916); Austin 
v. State of Tennessee, 179 U.S. 343 (1900). Apparently, 
Appellants believe recreational boating is an article of 
commerce; a dubious assumption. 
13 
Id. They again fail to demonstrate how the laws are not uniform or 
how the laws conflict. Indeed, as argued in this brief, the laws 
are uniform with reaard to ooat reguiacion on the CCNRA, and nave 
contributed to the national interests since the creation of the 
GCNRA, as evidenced by the continued growth in tourism and 
recreation in the area. 
III. APPELLANTS HAVE FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE THAT UTAH'S BOAT 
REGISTRATION STATUTE VIOLATES THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE 
CLAUSE OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION. 
Appellants argue that Utah's boat registration requirement 
that property taxes on recreational boats be paid before the boat 
owner may use the waters of Lake Powell violates the Interstate 
Commerce Clause. Appellants' Brief at 27. They say the tax 
imposes a substantially greater burden on Utah's boaters than 
adjacent States' boat registration laws impose on residents of 
those States, id. at 31, and that the tax is clearly excessive in 
relation to local benefits. Id. at 33. 
Again, an analysis of Appellants' arguments shows that they 
are wrong. 
A. Appellants Have Failed to Demonstrate That the Utah Tax 
Impermissibly Interferes with Interstate Commerce 
The Constitution gives Congress the power to regulate foreign 
and interstate commerce. U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8. Courts have 
ruled that States cannot regulate in a manner that unduly burdens 
or discriminates against interstate commerce unless Congress has 
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authorized the burden.7 See Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 
437 U.S. 609 (1981) . Nondiscriminatory state or local regulations 
with only incidental effects on interstate commerce are valid 
unless "the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in 
relation to the putative local benefits." Pike v. Bruce Church, 
Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). Under this test, the burden on 
interstate commerce must "clearly outweigh" legitimate state 
interests, and the statute must be "even-handed" in its treatment 
of in-state and out-of-state residents to survive. See Arkansas 
Elec. Co-op. Corp. v. Arkansas Pub. Service Comm'n, 461 U.S. 375, 
393-94 (1983); Bruce Church, 397 U.S. at 142. Dormant Commerce 
Clause analysis in cases where no discrimination is involved is an 
intricate balancing process, the object of which is to determine 
whether the state law is "unduly" burdensome. See Minnesota v. 
Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981); Commonwealth Edison 
Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609 (1981). 
Appellants have not alleged facts which demonstrate how Utah's 
tax has affected interstate commerce. Utah's tax to register a 
recreational boat is higher than in other adjacent States. 
However, Appellants fail to demonstrate how that fact is unduly 
burdensome to interstate commerce. There is no demonstrated effect 
on the movement of goods and services between States as the result 
of the tax, as was the case in Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 
U.S. 520 (1959), cited by Appellants. Appellants have not even 
7This is known as the "negative7' or "dormant" Commerce 
Clause. 
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demonstrated whether Utah's tax has resulted in fewer boat 
registrations in Utah, assuming for the sake of argument that fact 
is relevant: to an interstate commerce argument. Moreover, the tax 
is evenhanded because it is the same for a resident as for a non-
resident of Utah. 
The only thing that Appellants have alleged is that Utah's 
boater registration requirements vary so much from States adjacent 
to Lake Powell "that Utah's registration law must be found to 
impermissibly burdens (sic) interstate commerce when Utah's law is 
applied on Lake Powell or within the GCNRA." Appellants' Brief at 
33. This leap of logic hardly tips the scales in favor of the tax 
being unduly burdensome on interstate commerce. 
B. Appellants Have Not Demonstrated That Utah's Tax Is 
Clearly Excessive In Relation To Local Benefits 
Appellants' argument on this point is unclear as it makes no 
specific allegations as to how the Utah tax is clearly excessive in 
relation to local benefits. 
As the trial judge correctly noted in his Ruling on Motion to 
Dismiss: 
Property taxes are collected to support the general 
function of government, not the enforcement cf 
particular laws. The State of Utah has an 
obligation to provide general government services, 
such as law enforcement, social services, and 
education, within GCNRA. It is not required to 
demonstrate a direct quid pro quo relationship 
between revenues and expenditures. 
Arizona assumes that when Appellants are in Utah to use their 
boats they also take advantage of the general government services 
paid for in part by the Utah property taxes on their boats. 
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Appellants have failed to tip the scales in their favor by showing 
that the tax is "clearly excessive" in relation to those services. 
CONCLUSION 
The States cf Utah and Arizona have not been preempted by the 
federal government from jurisdiction to regulate boating in the 
GCNRA, including the registration of boats. Utah's property tax on 
boats does not conflict with Congress' regulation of interstate 
commerce on Lake Powell, and, in fact, complies with 46 U.S.C. § 
12307. The laws of both Arizona and Utah regarding registration 
and numbering of watercraft in those States works in harmony with 
federal laws and regulations. 
Moreover, Appellants have not demonstrated that the Utah tax 
violates the Interstate Commerce Clause. The tax does not 
impermissibly interfere with the movement of goods and services, 
and there are no facts to show that it is excessive in relation to 
local benefits it provides to the Appellants. 
The regulation of recreational vessels in the GCNRA, including 
their registration, by the States of Arizona and Utah work in 
harmony with federal regulation, and have done so since 1972. To 
grant the relief requested by the Appellants would upset the 
current, effective and lawful system, and throw this critical area 
into chaos in the GCNRA as well as other areas of Arizona and Utah, 
and in many other states. 
The relief requested by Appellants should be denied. 
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EXHIBIT A 
(A.R.S. §§ 5-321- 322 - Registration and Taxation of Watercraft) 
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ARTICLE 3. HEGISTHAIION AND TAXATION 
!OF WATERCHAFT 
5-321- Numbering; registrarion fees; license 
tax: repeal of registration; penalty; 
procedures 
A. The owner ax each watercrait requiring number-
ing' by uhis state snail ale an application for a regis-
tration number with the department, or its agent, on: 
forms approved by it. The application snail be signed 
by the owner of the watercrait and snail be accompa-
nied by a registration fee and a license tax levied at 
the following rates: 
L For a resident owner, denned as a person who 
owns a boat tor which registration is required and who 
is required to and does register motor vehicles owned 
by him in this state or. if no motor vehicle is owned by 
the person owning the boat, the person is a resident as 
denned by section 23-102. a registration fee of four 
dollars and a license tax of farty-dve cents per foot of 
length or fraction thereof of each watercrait up to and 
including eighteen, feet ano> sixty-^ight cents per foot 
of length for each foot or faction thereof over eighteen 
feet except as provided in section 5-322. 
2. For a nonresident owner, denned as any person 
who owns a boat for which registration is required and 
who is not a resident owner as denned by this section* 
a registration fee often dollars and a license tax ofone 
dollar forty-dve cents per foot ox" length or fraction, 
thereof of each watercrait np to and including eigh-
teen feet and two dollars seventy-Sve cents ^or foot of 
length for each foot or ixacaon thereof over eighteen, 
feet except as provided in section 5-322. 
3. The length of the watercrait 3hai] be. measured 
nrom the most forward part of the.bow excluding the 
bowsprit or jihboom, over the ce&variine to the 
jrearmost part of the transom f^rrhiAW^ sheer, out> 
!board motor, rudder., handles or. other attachments^ 
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Upon receipt of the application in approved* form, the 
department shall enter the same upon the records* of 
its-office and issue to the applicant two current annual 
decais and a certincate of number stating the number 
issued to the watercraft and the name and address of 
she owner. The owner snail display the assigned 
number and the current annna? decais in 3uch man-
ner as may be preserved by rules of the connnissiorL 
The numOer and decais snail be maintained in legible 
condition- The certincate of number, except as pro-
vided in section 5-371, snail be available at ail times 
for inspection by a peace officer whenever the water-
craft is in operation. No number issued by another 
state or the United States coast guard, unless granted 
exemption or exception pursuant to this chapter, shall 
be displayed on she watercrait. 
C. No watercraft 3hall be purchased, sold or other-
wise transferred without assignment by the owner of 
:he current numbering certincate or other documen-
tation as may be prescribed by rules of the commis-
sion. Within nfteen days alter such transfer, the 
person to whom such transfer is made shall make 
application to the department ZQ have the watercraft 
registered in his name by the department, for which 
the- department shall charge a transfer fee of four 
dollars. The department shall not issue or transfer a 
numbering certificate for a watercraft to a person who 
is subject zo the use tax under title 42, chapter 3, 
article 2 uniess ±e applicable cax has been paid as 
shown by a receipt ironi the collecting officer. Persons 
doing business as marine dealers and licensed as such 
by this 3tate are not required to register in their name 
any watercrait in their possession that may be offered 
for resale. 
D~ In- the. event of the loss or. destruction of the 
certincate of number or annual decai,. the department 
snail issue a duplicate thereof ;o. the owner upon 
payment of a fee of two dollars. 
E. The department may issue, any certincate of 
number directly or may authorize any person to act as 
agent for the issuance thereof in conformity with this 
chapter and with any ruies of the commission. 
R The owner shall furnish x the department no-
tice of the transfer of ail* or any part of his interest 
other- than the creation of a security interest in a 
watercraft.numbered in. this state pursuant to the 
provisions of this chapter or of the destruction or 
abandonment of such watercrait within nfteen days. 
Such transfer, destruction or abandonment shall ter-
minate che certincate of number of such watercraft, 
except that in the case of a transfer of a part interest 
which does not anect the owner's right to operate such 
watercrait, the transfer snail not terminate die cer-
tincate of "number. 
G. Any holder of a certincate of number shall notify 
the department within nfteen days if ^nis address no 
longer conforms to-, the address appearing on the 
certincate and snail,.,as a.part of such notification, 
furnish me department- with his new address. The 
commission may. provide in its rules for the surrendei: 
of the certificate bearing the former address and its 
replacement with a. certincate bearing the new ad-
dress or the alteration of an. outstanding certincate to 
show the new- address, of the.hoider. 
H. On renewal of any watercrait registration, that 
has not. been renewed, by the current expiration date^ 
the. department shall assess, a penalty nniess the 
watercraft" ownership has been transferred* and the 
watercraft was not registered subsequent: to-the-expi?-
ration^ date^The commission shaiTestablish- the- pen-
alty*- wMcu?siiall~hbt^exceed "fifteen doflarsTIf"more1 
date ot the last registration, or renewal the penalty is 
waived. 1994 
5-321»01« Staggered watercraft registrat ion; 
rules 
A. The commission shall establish, a system of 
staggered registration on a monthly basis in order ta 
distribute the work of registering watercraft as uni-
formiy as practicable throughout the twelve months of 
the calendar year. 
3 . Ail watercraft registrations provided for hi this 
article expire in accordance with the schedules, estab-
lished by the commission. The annmission may ser 
the number of renewal periods within a month from. 
one each month to one each day depending on whicir 
system is most economical and best accommodates the 
public. 
C. The commission, in order to ;nitiate the stag-
gered registration system, may register a watercraft 
for a period of greater or less than twelve months up 
to a period of eighteen months. If a registration period 
is set for a period other than twelve months the 
comrmssion may prorate the registration fee and 
license tax. 
D. The commission shall promulgate ruies neces-
sary to accomplish the purposes of this section. i982 
5-322. Watercraft to be numbered; exemptions; 
exceptions 
A. Ail undocumented watercraft whether under-
way, moored or anchored on the waters within che* 
boundaries of the state shall be numbered in accor-
dance with this chapteror by ruies and regulations ox 
die commission in: accordance'with the federally. ap-
prover mimfiermVsyite^ 
L Foreign watercraft temporarily using the waters 
of the state. 
2. Military or public vessels; of the United Statesr 
except recreational type public vessels. 
3. Watercraft used soieiy as life boats-
4. Undocumented watercraft operating under a 
valid temporary certificate - issued pursuant to the 
regulations prescribed by the commission. 
3 . Watercraft owned and operated exclusively by 
the state or by any political- subdivision thereof 3hail 
be numbered, but no tax. or registration fee snail be 
paid thereon. 
C. All nonresident owners of watercraft when in 
die course of interstate operation displaying a current 
and valid number issued under-an approved federal 
numbering system of the United States coast guard,, a 
state, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin 
Islands, Guam or the District of Columbia shall reg-
ister such watercraft with the department pnor to the 
expiration of the-reciprocity period prescribed by the 
regulations of the commission. 
D. All nonresident-owned watercrait, when in the 
course of interstate operation and not required to be 
numbered in their state of principal use, shall comply 
with the requirements- of subsection Cot this section. 
3 . Except as provided* in subsecdon ? of "this sec-
don, any person who is aresident 01 this state and is 
the owner of a watercraft snail number such water-
craft pursuant to § 3-321 prior to operating.; such 
watercraft on the waterways of the state. 
R When this state becomes the*oev: st^te of'prin-
cipal use of a watercraft displaying r n^nt- number 
issued under a federally approved nur ;><5ring system, 
the validity of such, number shall bs i^co^iizcdfor a 
peribd^oTninety days. Upon "expiration of the aiiiety-
day periodLand prior to any sofeseqw*, 
5-323 AMUSEMENTS AND SPORTS 
G.- Each dealer or manufacturer in this state en-
gaged in the sale of watercrait using such watercrait 
for demonstration shail obtain one or more dealer 
watercrait certificates of number- with the current 
validating decais. Applications, renewal and display 
of certificates of number shall be as prescribed in this 
chapter or by regulations of the commission, except 
that the annual fee.will be two dollars fifty cent3 tor 
each certificate of number and accompanying current 
decais. 
H. Owners of commercial watercrait not exempted 
from the ad valorem property taxes under the provi-
sions of article 9, section 16 of the Arizona Constitu-
cion shall be exempt irom the lieu tax requirements of 
§ 5-321 of this chapter. 1975 
